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United States Savings Bonds payable on the death of the deceased to one of the legatees. After removing the United States
bonds from the succession assets44 and after reducing the legacies .in order to satisfy the legitime of the forced heir, the court
held that since there were not sufficient assets to pay all the
45
particular legacies, the cash legacies must fail.
Identity of Legatee
In Succession of Rome 1 the court had no difficulty in determining from the testimony adduced at the probate of the testament, that the plaintiff was actually the person intended by the
testatrix as her legatee. Where the legatee's name is not given
in full, the court states, parol testimony is admissible under
articles 1714 and 1715 of the Civil Code to remove the obscurity
47
or ambiguity.

THE COMMUNITY OF ACQUETS AND GAINS
Robert A. Pascal*

PROOF OF ACQUISITION WITH SEPARATE FUNDS
The Succession of Winsey is of more than usual interest. A
wife had purchased immovables in her own name through authentic acts in which the husband had admitted the parapher44. Although the United States Savings Bonds were fictitiously added to the
mass in order to determine the legitime of the forced heir, the court had already
held that these bonds were governed by federal law and should therefore be paid
to the beneficiary thereof. Succession of Mulqueeny, 156 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963). The effect of excluding the bonds, therefore, is that they were not
subject to reduction as were the other legacies, in order to make up the legitime of
the forced heirs. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1635 (1870) : "If the effects do not suffice to discharge the particular legacies, the legacies of a certain object must be first taken
out. The surplus of the effects must then be proportionally divided among the
legatees of sums of money, unless the testator has expressly declared that such a
legacy shall be paid in preference to the rest, or that the legacy is given as a
recompense for services." Cf. Succession of Berdon, 202 La. 607, 12 So. 2d 654
(1943), 5 LA. L. REV. 519-520 (1944).
46. Succession of Rome, 169 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
47. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1714 (1870) : "In case of ambiguity or obscurity in
the description of the legatee, as, for instance, when a legacy is bequeathed to
one of two individuals hearing the same name, the inquiry shall be which of the
two was upon terms of the most intimate intercourse or connection with the
testator, and to him shall the legacy be decreed."
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 170 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
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nality of the funds used by her. On the husband's death the
notary public taking an inventory of his succession listed these
immovables as community assets, presumably because of the presumption established in article 2405 of the Civil Code that at
dissolution of the regime all assets possessed by the spouses are
to be regarded as forming part of the community until it is
proved otherwise. The surviving wife attempted to establish the
paraphernal character of the acquisitions, but the court of appeal, finding the evidence inadequate to prove the paraphernality
of the funds used, allowed the presumption in article 2405 to
stand and declared the immovables community assets. The writer submits that both the notary public and the court were in
error.
The acquisitions had been by authentic acts and the husband
had admitted in each the paraphernality of the funds used to
pay the price. Authentic acts not forgeries are full proof of
their contents even against forced heirs 2 unless the latter prove
them to be simulations, or donations in disguise.3 Thus it was
not for the notary public to inventory the immovables as community assets; the allegations in authentic acts should overcome
the presumption established by article 2405, a jurisprudence to
the contrary notwithstanding ;4 and until the forced heirs prove
the donation in disguise, all persons are bound to respect the
authentic act for what it purports to be. Moreover, it is submitted that there was no question of a donation in disguise here.
Even if the husband had in fact supplied the purchase price to
the wife in each case, it must be remembered that husbands
may donate either community funds or their separate assets to
their wives and that the donation of funds may be made manually. Had the husband given the funds to the wife manually
two years, two months, two days, or two minutes before she
had made each purchase, there could not have been any basis
in the legislation for considering these acts anything but valid
donations. The husband's admissions in the acts of purchase
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2236 (1870).
3. Id. art. 2239, as amended in 1894. Before this amendment forced heirs,
could not avoid a donation in disguise, but only have it reduced to the extent it
exceeded the disposable portion. The writer believes the original rule was preferable.
4. There is much jurisprudence to the contrary. A very clear statement of'
the jurisprudence's stand is to be found in the dissenting opinion of the late
Judge Herget in Murray v. Shaw, 165 So. 2d 697, 702 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
The writer does not agree with this jurisprudence for reasons which appear in
the body of the discussion of this subject.
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would then have been technically accurate. But even if we assume that what actually transpired was that the husband paid
the price on the wife's behalf, intending a donation to her, were
the forced heirs placed in a position different from that in which
they would have been as a result of manual donations preceding
the acts of purchase? Notice or recordation of donations of
non-mortgageable things is not required and forced heirs could
not have complained of the lack of notice of manual donations.
On proving a donation, of course, the forced heirs would have
been entitled to demand a reduction of it to the extent it exceeded
the disposable portion, but the immovables were in all events
the assets of the wife by purchase with separate funds.
Conceding arguendo that the transactions involved donations
in disguise of the funds used to pay the price, the following
observations might be made:
1.

The allegations in the authentic act should have been
deemed to overcome the presumption established by article 2405 and thus neither should the notary have inventoried the immovables as community assets, nor should
the court have made article 2405 the basis of considering
them to be such.

2. If the acts of purchase were simulations, they were so
only as donations in disguise of the funds used and not
as donations of the immovables. The immovables themselves had not been taken from the community assets or
those of the husband, and as between the third party
seller and the spouses and their representatives, there
was a valid act of purchase in the name of the wife, whatever its effect as between the husband and wife or their
representatives.
3. Had the forced heirs brought suit and proved the funds
used to have been donations in disguise from the husband's separate assets, then they would have been entitled
to judgment for the full amount of the funds donated.
4. Had the forced heirs proved the donation to have been
made from community funds, then it would have been
necessary to ascertain whether, under the legislation as
it now stands, the acquisition in the name of the wife
with consent of the husband and with funds derived from
a donation which is (subject to being declared?) a nul-
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lity, is to be considered (a) a community asset or (b) the
paraphernal asset of the wife. Under solution (a) the
forced heirs would have been entitled to one-half interests in the immovables themselves; under solution (b)
they would have been entitled to a judgment for one-half
the amounts donated, applying article 2408 of the Civil
Code.
5. If, once the donations in disguise were proved to have
been made with community assets and declared null, the
acts of purchase were to be treated as simple acts of purchase with community funds in the name of the wife and
with concurrence of the husband, then a mechanical application of the traditional solution would result in the
acquisitions being considered community assets. The writer submits, however, that the traditional rule served a
principle of the regime of community of acquets and
gains formally abandoned in the amendment to article
2334 in 1912 and should itself be abandoned where the
intention of the parties indicated another result. Before
1912 even purchases with separate funds became community assets simply because all "acquets" during marriage
were to be considered such. Now that acquisitions during
marriage may be separate, under article 2334, there is
no reason to apply the older rule to acquisitions in the
name of either spouse concurred in by the other, for in
either case the concurring spouse intends that the acquisition be the separate asset of the spouse in whose
name it is made. If the donation of community funds implicit in this solution is considered null as one in disguise
or otherwise, the acquisition itself would continue to be
the separate asset of the spouse in whose name it was
made even though the forced heirs would be allowed to
claim one-half of the community funds used to purchase it.
ACTS OF THE WIFE IN RELATION TO THE HUSBAND AND THE
COMMUNITY OF ACQUETS AND GAINS

With one possible exception, that pertaining to the acts of
the wife as a public merchant,, there is no legislation whatsoever
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 131 (1870). This article, as limited by article 1786
of the Civil Code, means that the husband who permits his wife to act as a public
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stating that the wife may obligate the husband personally, or
administer, obligate, encumber, or dispose of a community asset.
Article 1786, so often cited as authority for the proposition that
the wife may obligate the husband for "necessaries" for herself
and the family, if he fails or neglects to supply them, does no
more than authorize the wife to obligate herself in such an
event.6 As far as acts of administration, encumbrance, or disposal of community effects are concerned, article 2404 indicates
that it is the husband alone who may accomplish these. The
married women's emancipation acts have not increased the wife's
power in any of these respects. 7 It has always been understood,
however, that the act of the wife affecting a community asset
(or an asset of the husband's separate patrimony) made with
the husband's concurrence or consent obligates him as well as
her. And this understanding seems proper, for in concurring
or consenting to an act affecting assets under his control, the
husband, in substance if not in technical form, constitutes the
wife his mandatary. The judgment in Mid-State Homes, Inc. v.
Davis,8 in which the wife acting alone had attempted to hypothecate a community immovable, is consistent with what has been
said here.
On the other hand, the results reached in many cases, if not
the language of the opinions, imply that the wife can acquire
assets which will fall into the community of acquets and gains
even if she acts in her own name and without her husband's
concurrence or consent. Thus in four cases of the 1964-65 term
the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal presumably would
have found immovables purchased by wives to be community
assets had they or their heirs not proven the purchases to have
been made with separate funds. The writer submits that the
merchant is presumed legally to authorize her contracts in trade and that he as
well as she is obligated by them if there is a "community of property" between
them. In question today, with regard to the wife over eighteen years of age
since the enactment of the married women's legislation (LA. R.S. 9:101-105
(1950)), is whether the wife who acts as a public merchant without her husband's consent can ever bind him in view of a provision of the emancipation
legislation itself (LA. R.S. 9:105) under which the laws on the community of
acquets and gains are not to be deemed affected or modified thereby.

6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1786 (1870).

The wife, nevertheless, may justly be

presumned to have a mandate from him, at least while they are living together,
to charge ordinary purchases and expenses for running the household and for
maintaining the family, unless lie has taken such steps as he may be required to
indicate that he has not given or revoked such authority ; and she may also obligate
him by acts of negotiorum gestio under article 2299 of the Civil Code.

7. LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950).
8. 173 So. 2d 326

(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).

9. Succession of Smith, 247 La. 921, 175 So. 2d 269 (1965) ; Murray v. Shaw,
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wife acting in her own name and without her husband's consent
or concurrence cannot be said to have the capacity to acquire
things which will fall into the community of acquets and gains
any more than she can be said to have the capacity to obligate
the husband or dispose of community assets, whether the funds
used form part of the community of acquets and gains, her husband's separate patrimony, or her own. Article 2402 does say
acquisitions in the name of the wife fall into the community of
acquets and gains, but when that article was written no act of
acquisition by the wife could be opposed to her husband unless
he concurred in the act or gave his consent in writing. Today
the married woman may contract without her husband's concurrence or consent under the married women's emancipation
legislation; but that legislation itself states that its provisions
are not intended to alter the laws on the community of acquets
and gains, 10 which laws include article 2404 of the Civil Code
making the husband head and master of the community and
giving him complete control. It is suggested that under the
present law if the wife has acquired something in her own name
and without her husband's consent, it is always hers; but if
community funds or separate funds of the husband have been
used to make the acquisition, the husband has the right to recover from her the sums used as he might from any third
person."
The jurisprudence admits that the husband is not rendered
liable by the acts of the wife clearly in her name and on her
credit alone. Thus in Hagedorn Motors, Inc. v. Godwin,12 in
which the evidence indicated quite clearly that the wife and husband had made it known to the seller of an automobile that she
alone was purchasing it, the court had no hesitancy in finding
the husband not liable. Again, the decisions do not hold the
165 So. 2d 697 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1964); Succession of Evans, 171 So. 2d 738
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1905) ; and Succession of Marshall, 174 So. 2d 234 (La. App.

4th Cir. 1965).
10. LA. R.S. 9:105 (1950).
11. There is no legislation forbidding the husband to sue the wife in any case
for any reason, although R.S. 9:291 forbids suits by the wife against the husband
except in certain cases, one of which is to recover her paraphernal assets in his
hands. The jurisprudence has recognized the right of the husband to sue the wife
in instances in which she could sue him, but has gone no further. See Seeling v.
Seeling, 133 So. 2d 168 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), an instance of a suit to

recover separate assets in the wife's hands. Probably this jurisprudence would
be interpreted to permit the husband to sue for community assets in the wife's
hands, but the writer submits no restriction on suits by the husband against the
wife exists at all.

12. 170 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).

1966]

PRIVATE LAW

husband obliged for purchases by the wife, without his consent
or authorization, even though they might fairly be said to have
been made on the husband's credit, unless they are purchases of
"necessaries." Thus in Nationwide Acceptance Co. v. Griffin,18
the husband was not held liable for the purchase of a large quantity of meat in a case in which both seller and wife intended to
obligate the husband, because the quantity purchased exceeded
that "necessary" at the time of purchase. It is submitted, however, that by custom supplementing the law in Louisiana, the
husband may be presumed to have tacitly authorized his wife
to make not only necessary purchases, but also all contracts
which might be deemed usual or ordinary in the course of providing for the life of the family according to her husband's
means and station in life, unless he has effectively revoked or
terminated this authority. Under this rule not only necessaries,
but also purchases ordinary or usual in the light of the family's
means and station in life, unless he has effectively revoked or
by the, wife acting as his mandatary under express or tacit authorization. It is well to remember too that the seldom invoked
rule in article 2299 might be used in appropriate cases to hold
the husband liable for acts accomplished on his credit by the
wife. Using the presumption of tacit mandate or article 2299,
the misuse of article 1786 and notions of "ratification by inaction" could be avoided.
TRUST INCOME ACCUMULATED FOR HUSBAND

Dunham v. Dunham,14 if allowed to stand, will provide a
method by which certain income of the husband might be excluded: from the community of acquets and gains without resort
to a marriage contract. The husband, while yet unmarried, had
been made sole beneficiary of a trust the income from which was
to be accumulated during the life of the trust. The beneficiary
married and was divorced before the trust ended. At its termination the former wife demanded one-half of the income from the
trust during the period of the marriage, alleging it to have
been income which fell into the community of acquets and gains.
In deciding that the accumulated income belonged to the beneficiary husband's separate patrimony the court reasoned that
(1) article 2402 of the Civil Code considers income a community
13. 171 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
14. 174 So. 2d 898 (La. App. lst Cir. 1965).
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asset only if it is from effects of which the husband has administration and enjoyment; that (2) the trustee and not the
husband beneficiary owned the assets in trust; that (3) the
trustee and not the husband had administration of the assets
in trust; and that (4) the income being accumulated throughout
the marriage, the husband did not have enjoyment of it during
that time.
In reaching conclusion (2) above the court specifically rejected the notion that the beneficiary owned the assets in trust
while the trustee had administration of them for him, a position
which had been reached in the federal court decision in United
States v. Burglass (1949),15 and in so doing added another ob-

stacle to the integration of trust law with Louisiana property
law concepts. Had the court understood the trustee's position
to be administrative or managerial and not proprietary, it would
have been easy for it to see that income from a trust should be a
community asset as much as the income from an interdict's
patrimony being administered by a curator. And although the
interdict does not have administration in fact of his assets, his
income falls into the community of acquets and gains if he is
married and living under that regime; so too should the income
from a trust. The root of the difficulty here is that the court
failed to understand that the phrasing of article 2402 was not
intended to mean that actual administration by the husband of
his own assets is necessary for the income to fall into the community, but rather that income from the dotal or paraphernal
assets of the wife, and probably that of the assets of children
under paternal authority, were to be regarded as gains falling
into the community. Moreover, the "and enjoyment" phrase in
article 2402 was almost certainly intended to mean only that
income from assets which the husband administered, but to
which he was not entitled, did not fall into the community of
assets and gains. Income from assets of a minor in the husband's tutorship, and that from assets of the wife administered
by him under mandate from her, under the jurisprudence as it
stood before 1944, when article 2386 of the Civil Code was
amended, might be given as examples. Finally, the trust was not
known when article 2402 was drafted and the situation presented
here could not have been foreseen. In short, a comprehension
15. 172 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1949).
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of the meaning of article 2402 in the light of its historical and
functional setting would have enabled the court to avoid the
error committed in this case. Under the regime of community
of acquets and gains all profits, or income, from assets of the
husband are to be considered community assets. The accumulated
trust income was income of the husband credited to his account,
even though not paid to him, and therefore enjoyed by him
within the meaning of article 2402.
The opinion in Dunham does not say income paid to the husband during the marriage would not be a community asset, but
it is submitted that under conclusions (2) and (3) reached by
the court and mentioned above, the same result would be indicated. A third party (the trustee) would own the property and
that party would be administrator of it, even though the husband-beneficiary would "enjoy" the income under the court's
construction of that word. Furthermore, the reasoning in Dunham would seem to apply equally well to a trust established
during marriage in favor of the husband. Here the opportunity
for fraud on the wife's expectancies under the matrimonial
regime are obvious.
DELICTUAL OBLIGATIONS

OF HUSBAND TO WIFE

Under R.S. 9:291 as interpreted, the wife may not enforce
her substantive rights against her husband during marriage in
any but a few specified instances, none of which includes injury or damage suffered because of the delict or quasi delict of
the husband; but the jurisprudence allows her to sue one obligated with her husband for the same wrong. The obligation
arising from delict being solidary as to the person injured or
damaged, but joint among the co-obligors themselves, the obligor
cast in judgment may demand contribution from his co-obligor.
Thus it is that in Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.' 6
the obligor sued by the wife filed a third party demand for contribution against her husband should he be cast in judgment
as a co-obligor. The co-obligor was cast, and the court allowed
the demand for contribution. The husband objected that to allow
him to be joined in suit and cast in judgment in this manner
was to permit indirectly what cannot be done directly under
16. 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965).
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R.S. 9:291; but in addition he complained that, inasmuch as he
himself was not insured, a judgment against him would be payable out of community funds, which were half his wife's, thus
in fact reducing her recovery by half the amount payable to the
co-obligor. The writer submits that neither contention was sound
and that the Supreme Court reached the proper result.
Whatever the merits of R.S. 9:291 between husband and
wife as such, it would be unthinkable to deny the husband's coobligor the right to contribution merely because the legislation
makes the husband safe from suit by the wife during marriage.
Moreover the husband's argument with regard to the wife's
recovery being reduced because the co-obligor could enforce
his judgment against community funds is not well founded.
Although a third party creditor, such as the husband's co-obligor
in this case, may always obtain satisfaction out of the community
funds as well as the husband's separate funds, it does not follow
necessarily that ultimate liability is to be shared by the wife.
Thus, for example, even though the husband's pre-marital (and
therefore separate) creditors may enforce their rights out of
the community funds as well as out of the separate assets of
the husband, as between husband and wife these pre-marital
debts are to be paid out of the husband's separate funds, as
article 2403 of the Civil Code indicates, and on termination of
the regime the wife is entitled, under the principle announced
in article 2408, to receive from the husband an amount equal to
one-half the amount of community funds used to pay the husband's separate debts. The writer suggests that the husband's
delictual obligation to the wife is to be considered his separate
obligation, for one spouse should not be made to suffer a loss
caused by the fault of the other; and accordingly that although
the co-obligor, like any separate creditor of the husband, might
enforce his right against community funds, the husband would
have to account to the wife at the termination of the regime for
one-half the community funds used to satisfy the co-obligor's
claim. On the other hand, even if it were said that the husband's
delictual obligation to the wife is one which as between them
is to be paid out of community funds, the wife would have no
right to complain, for then her "loss" would result from the
matrimonial regime presumably agreed upon between her and
her husband.

